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Case No. 7650

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GLADYS E. HAMILTON,
Appellant,
vs.

SALT LAKE CITY C-ORPORATION, KENNETH J. PINNEY,
doing business as PINNEY BEVERAGE COMPANY, and PROVO
CITY BASEBALL CLUB, a partnership,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GLADYS E. HAMILTON,
Appellant,

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY C·ORPORATION, KENNETH J. PINNEY,
doing business as PINNEY BEVERAGE CO niP ANY, and PROVO
CITY BASEBALL CLl:B, a partnership,

Case No.
7650

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case was disposed of by the Trial Court at
the pre-trial hearing. The positions of the parties were
there taken and stated, and thereupon the Trial Court
reached the conclusion that Plaintiff was not entitled
to recover. The findings of the Court in its pre-trial
order, give the basic elements upon which the parties
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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relied. Since the Court disposed of the case by concluding that whatever duty the City may have been
under to furnish protection to Plaintiff, it discharged
such duty by providing the protective screen described
in the findings and revealed in the photographs of the
screen, introduced in evidence as Exhibits 1, 2 ~d 3,
and that the Plaintiff assumed any risk involved of
inadequate protection, we shall confine our statement
of facts to those facts having a bearing upon these legal
propositions. Therefore, such questions as to whether
the City, in the maintenance and conduct of Derk's Field,
was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity,
or whether it had ·any responsibility to Plaintiff at all
since it was a lessor, or as an owner who had permitted
others to use its property and to whom it had surrendered control, or what its relationship to the ball clubs
and hence to Plaintiff was, are purposely not considered
in our brief.
Defendant owns Derk's Field and constructed a
baseball park thereon with a grandstand and bleachers.
It erected a mesh wire screen in front of the grandstand, about 35 feet back from home base. The screen
is 32 feet high and 150 feet long. Defendant permitted
the use of the park by two baseball teams sponsored by
Pinney Beverage Comp·any and Provo City Baseball
Club. These teams played in the park on the evening
of July 9, 1947. Plaintiff paid the admission charge to
the game and selected a seat about 15 feet behind the
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sereen and in the center of the screened portion of the
grandstand. In the 14th inning a foul ball went over
the sereen and came down inside the screen, striking
Plaintiff on the back and base of her ne.ck, causing the
injuries for 'Yhich this action is brought.
It is apparent from the Court's finding, paragraph
5, "rhich also follows the language of Plaintiff's claim
filed 'vith the City, in evidence as Exhibit 'A', and Complaint, that Plaintiff was well avvare of the fact that to
watch a baseball game involved some danger to spectators from batted or thrown balls. She alleges, and
the Court finds, that she "selected a seat about 15 feet
behind and in the center of the screened portion of the
grandstand, which she considered and assumed to be,
and which she selected as being in a place of safety,
where she could not be injured by batted or thrown
balls." This clearly indicates that she was well aware
that there were hazards involved in watching the game
from batted and thrown balls. It further indicates that
she saw the screen; was aware of its nature and height
and that there was no overhead coverage as the screen
was plainly visible before her and was there to be seen.
To her the screen appeared sufficient to protect her.
She deliberately chose a seat behind it, having passed
judgment as to its adequacy as a protection to her.
There is no allegation, nor is there any finding in
the pre-trial order, that this desire of the Plaintiff to
be seated in a place which would afford her absolute
protection against balls was ever communicated to anySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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one connected with the Defendant or the management
of the hall field at any time. From all that appears in
the case this was simply her own unexpressed thinking,
of which she alone was aware. Had she made known her
desire to sit in a fully covered spot, she could have used
the press box in the top of the grandstand shown on
Exhibit 1, wh~ch has a roof and is entirely enclosed.
There is no. evidence that .that place was not available.
Nor is there anything in the record to show that
any representations were made to Plaintiff by anyone
as to the screen being sufficient to intercept and prevent
every ball from falling back of it or at the place where
the Plaintiff sat. All that the record shows is that the
screen was there plainly visible; its nature could readily
be seen as the photographs show. She knew it was
there. No one, therefore, misled or influenced her in
any·way in her selection of the seat she chose. In assuming she was selecting a place of absolute safety she
relied solely on her own judgment with the physical
conditions fully visible and apparent. No one but herself
knew why she made the selection she did or how she
came to conclude that she was in ·a place of absolute
safety.
There is no allegation or elai~ that she was incapable of arriving at a judgment of the hazards involved
in view of the type of screen there before her. It is
not claimed that she was ignorant of the hazards or
that she had never before seen a baseball game. On the
contrary, as already pointed out, she well knew there
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were hazards and she relied solely upon her own judgment in selerting ""hat she considered to be a safe place.
Her selection was made ""ith the physical facts plainly
apparent to anyone "~ho n1ight look.
On the question of negligence, Plaintiff's position
is stated by the Trial Court, Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the
findings as follo,Ys :
"6. That Plaintiff claims in this case that
Salt Lake City Corporation was negligent in its
construction and maintenance of the Ball Park,
and in authorizing and permitting the use thereof
while not having a screen in front of said grandstand and Plaintiff's seat, of sufficient height or
of sufficient overhead covering so as to prevent
batted balls from going over said screen and
striking Plaintiff, and in permitting Plaintiff to
be injured by a batted ball after being lulled
into a sense of security by reason of the screen;
and that the negligence of the Defendant City
proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries.
"7. That Plaintiff further claims that in the
operation of said Ball Park, it was the duty of
the City to have a reasonable number of protected seats so that those patrons, including Plaintiff, who desired a protected seat, could select
such a protected seat, where they, and she, would
be in a place of safety and a place where they,
and she, would be protected from injury."
This position so stated by the Court in Paragraph
6 above follows almost identically the allegations of
negligence in Plaintiff's claim, Exhibit 'A', and in her
Complaint. It is thus apparent that Plaintiff's action
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is not based upon a failure of the City to exercise reasonable care to afford reasonable protection to spectators
in screening the grandstand. It is based upon the
proposition that it was the Defendant's duty to provide
Plaintiff a place of absolute safety and immunity against
the hazards naturally incident to a baseball game; that
Plaintiff, having observed there was a screen in front
of her, had the right to assume that that screen would
absolutely prevent any ball from reaching her and so
she had no risk to assume. Plaintiff's position is that
the City was bound to erect a screen of sufficient height
or an ove-rhead covering that would prevent balls from
going over the screen and falling in the grandstand
where she was sitting. In other words, it is clear that
Plaintiff attempts to recover in this action upon the
basis that the City was an insurer of her safety when
she chose a seat in the grandstand back of the screen.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.
THE CITY AS THE OWNER OF DERK'S FIELD IS
NOT AN INSURER OF THE PERSONS ATTENDING
BASEBALL GAMES.

II.
THE CITY DISCHARGED ANY DUTY WHICH IT
OWED TO PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE BY PROVIDING
THE SCREEN SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE.
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III.
WHATEVER DANGER TO PLAINTIFF EXISTED FROM
FOUL BALLS GOING UP OVER THE SCREEN WAS AS
OBVIOUS TO HER AS TO DEFENDANT, AND SHE
ASSUl\1ED THE RISK INCIDENT THERETO.

IV.
THAT THERE ARE DANGERS INHERENT IN BASEBALL GAMES IS A MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE
AND P LA IN T I F F WAS, UNDER THE EVIDENCE,
CHARGED WITH SUCH KNOWLEDGE AND BOUND TO
TAKE NOTICE THEREOF.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CITY AS THE OWNER OF DERK'S FIELD IS
NOT AN INSURER OF T'HE PERSONS ATTENDING
BASEBALL GAMES.

In view of the conclusion reached by the Trial
Court that the Defendant discharged its duty to Plaintiff in providing the screen it did, we do not desire in
this appeal to attempt a statement of the precise duty,
if any, which Defendant owed Plaintiff in this case.
The fact is the Defendant owned the ball park, but at
the time of Plaintiff's injury it was being used by two
(2) semi-pro ball teams under an arrangement with
Defendant for its use. Just what the relationship was
between Defendant and the ball clubs was not decided.
The Trial Court simply found, for the purposes of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pre-trial proceeding, that the Defendant leased the ball
field to the two (2) teams, but left the matter open for
further evidenc~ in the event of a reversal by the appellate court. For the purpose of its decision, the Trial
Court concluded that whatever duty Defendant owed
to Plaintiff to furnish a protected seat, it discharged
that duty by providing the protective screen described
in the findings. It was clear to the Trial Court, and
it was frankly admitted by Plaintiff's counsel, that
Plaintiff's action was predicated upon the legal premise
that it was Defendant's duty to furnish absolute protection to Plaintiff from batted or thrown balls by providing her with a seat where no ball could reach her at
any time under any conditions. And, further, that she
had a right to assume that the screen provided by the
Defendant was of such structure and nature as to prevent any ball from reaching her in the course of the
game, which would relieve her of any assumption of
risk.
That the owner or user of a ball park is not an
insurer of the safety of the persons attending a baseball
game is held by all the authorities, including those
cited by· Plaintiff. Counsel for Plaintiff now seems to
concede this proposition for he apparently abandons
the position stated as his position by the Trial Court
in Paragraph 6 of his findings, above quoted, and now,
for the first time, in his brief takes the position that
Defendant's duty did not extend beyond the furnishing
of seats that "were reasonably protected from foul
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balls.''-(Page 1-t of Plaintiff's brief). He goes on to
assert that the fact that a foul ball fell at a place 15
feet back of the screen indicates that there were no seats
"reasonably safe~' or safe as a matter of law.

'
\\. .e shall cite a few of the authorities to illustrate
the proposition stated under Point I.
38 Am. Jur. Sec. 92 pp. 751-52, states:

"An owner's liability to such persons for
injuries not intentionally inflicted must be predicated upon negligence; and the owner, as such,
is not an insurer against accidents upon the
premises, even as to persons whom he had invited
to enter."
Edling vs. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition
Co., 181 ~Io. App. 327, 168 S.W. 908, a case where the
ball went through a hole in the screen about a foot
square, the screen being old, worn, and rotten, the
Court says:
"One of the natural risks encountered by
spectators of a professional baseball game is
that of being struck by a foul ball, and it goes
without saying that Defendant was not required
by law, and it did not undertake, to insure the
patrons of the screened-in portion of its grandstand immunity against injury from such source;
but being in the business of providing public
entertainment for profit, Defendant was bound
to exercise reasonable care to protect its patrons
against such injury."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Curtis vs. Portland Baseball Club, 130 Ore. 93,
279 P. 277, in which a spectator behind the screen was
struck by a foul ball curving around the end of the
screen far enough into the grandstand to strike Plaintiff.
It was contended that the Defendant should have had
wings at the end of the screen. The Court said :
"It (Defendant) was not, however, an insurer
of their safety. It was required to use only that
degree of care exercised by persons of ordinary
prudence and caution engaged in similar business."

Hudson vs. Kansas City Baseball Club, 164 S.W.
2d 318. Here Plaintiff assumed he was sitting in a
screened portion, having asked for the best reserve
seat. He was sitting, however, in an unscreened portion
of the grandstand. The Court says:
"Conversely, and as applied to a place of
public amusement as well as to a place of business, the invitor is not an insurer of the safety
of the invitee. Neither is the invitee protected
against all hazard, nor relieved of all duty to
himself for his own safety and to the extent that
the duty of 'protection rests upon the invitee,
the duty of the invitor to protect is reduced. The
extent of these relative duties depends upon many
factors involving the capacity and opportunity
of the invitor to protect the invitee and the capacity and opportunity of the invitee to protect
himself.' Ivory vs. Cincinnati Baseball Club Co.,
62 Ohio Ap. 514, 518, 24 N.E. 2d, 837, 839."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Pollan vs. City of Dotham, 8 So. 2d 813: This case
involv.ed the sufficiency of the Complaint to state a cause
of action. The foul ball "~ent through a hole in the
screen. The Court says:
"There is an absence of averments of negligence in either Counts I or II or statement of
fact sho,Ying a duty o"\ving by either of the De:..
fendants to Plaintiff and a breach thereof. The
pleader, in drawing these Counts, apparently
proceeded on the idea that the Defendant municipal corporation, because of the leasehold were
insurers of the safety of persons entering as
invitees, and that they were therefore liable for
Plaintiff's personal injury, by negligence. That
is not the law. City of Bir·mingham vs. Carle,
191 Ala. 539, 68 So. 22 L.R.A. 1916 F. 797."
POINT II.
THE CITY DISCHARGED ANY DUTY WHICH IT
OWED TO PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE BY PROVIDING
THE SCREEN SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE.

Plaintiff took the position that it was the duty of
the Defendant to provide either a screen of sufficient
height that no foul ball could go over it, or Defendant
should have provided an over-head covering or roof
over the grandstand in addition to the upright screen.
No case is cited to sustain such view and no case can
be found which will support it, for, as already pointed
out, such a proposition is tantamount to making Defendant an insurer of the safety of those seated in the
grandstand. Nor does Plaintiff cite any case or authority
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

to sustain Plaintiff's new position, asserted for the first
time in her brief, namely, that the screen provided
did not furnish reasonable protection to Plaintiff. In
view of Plaintiff's new position involving "reasonable
protection" instead of absolute protection, as contended
for in her claim and Complaint and before the Trial
Court at the pre-trial reflected in Paragraph 6 of the
Court's findings, it might be well here to inquire as to
how high should the screen be to afford reasonable
protection~

Again, at what height above the height of

Defendant's screen would an upright screen be considere9. inadequate and so require
tective covering to supplement

it~

an

over-head pro-

For admittedly there

is a ·limit to the height a screen could be built to stand
the stress of storms or other forces and yet be open
enough to permit spectators a reasonably unobstructed
view of the game. It is common lmowledge that foul
balls frequently attain a height of 100 feet or more and
sometimes go so high as to be almost lost to sight.
Plaintiff cites three (3) cases. The first case·, Crane
vs. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App.
301, 153 S.W. 1076, involved a case where Plaintiff
was injured while sitting in an area unprotected by a
screen while protected seats were available. It was held
that Plaintiff could not recover. The Court was not,
therefore, attempting to define what kind of a screen
would, in law, be adequate to discharge the owner's
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duty to spectators. It Inerely said there should be
seats provided 'vhich 'vere protected by screening, the
one there involved evidently being an upright one.
The case of Edling 'VS. Kansas City Baseball and
Exhibition Co .. 181 Thfo ..A. pp. 327, 168 S.W. 908, from
which "~e have quoted, involved an upright screen that
had a hole in it one foot square. The Court there held
the Defendant was not an insurer; that it was Defendant's duty to keep the screen free from defects, and if it
allowed to secreen to become defective with holes and
rotten, that constituted negligence. As to such negligence the Plaintiff did not assume the risk in seating
himself behind the screen.
In Quinn vs. Recreation Park Association, 3 Cal.
2d 725, 46 P. 2d 144, a 14-year old girl wanted a screened
seat near first base. There being none available, she
was ushered to an unscreened section near first base.
She was struck by a foul ball. There is no description
of the screen in the opinion. The seats in the grandstand are spoken of as "screened seats." But the Court
does say that the duty "imposed by law is performed
when screened seats are provided." It further holds
that the "management is not required, nor does it
undertake to insure patrons against injury from such
sources (batted or thrown balls). All that is required
is the exercise of reasonable care to protect patrons
against such injuries." The Court held Plaintiff assumed
the risk of sitting where she did. Certainly this case
is no authority for Plaintiff's position.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Leek vs. Tacoma Baseball Club, ______ Wash., 229
P. 2d 329, the precise propositions relied upon by Plaintiff in this appeal were disposed of contrary to Plaintiff's position and in complete harmony with the Trial
Court's ruling. In that case Leek purchased a grandstand ticket and entered the park about 8 :00 p.m. It
was then twilight and the flood lights h·ad not yet been
turned on. His seat was directly behind home plate in
the fourth row from the front. It was behind a vertical
wire screen 26 feet high and 34 feet wide. Th~ grandstand was not roofed and there was no overhead screen.
Leek did not look to see if there was any overhead protection and he had never before been in this ball park.
A short time after he had taken his seat, the batter
hit a high foul into this section of the grandstand.
Leek watched the ball start up, but lost sight of it in
the twilight haze. He turned around, and just then the
ball struck him in the head, rendering him unconscious.
He was a man 65 years old, a carpenter by trade. He
had played hall as a boy and had seen games infrequently since that time. He wore glasses and had
normal vision. An officer of the Defendant testified that
five to eight balls dropped into the stands at every game;
that it was not unusual for these fouls to drop into the
stands immediately behind the home plate. The only
question presented on appeal was whether under these
facts Plaintiff was entitled to recover. The case was
dismissed by the Trial Court on Defendant's motion at
the close of Plaintiff's case. The judgment of the lower
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Court \Yas affir1ned. The Plaintiff contended that Defendant HproYided no seats \Yhich 'vere effectively screened, and that there \Yas accordingly a failure of the proprietor to perforn1 his established duty of providing
some screened seats." The Court refers to some cases,
including the Crane case and the Quinn case, supra,
relied upon by Plaintiff in the instant case, which state
that it is the duty of the proprietor to furnish some
screened seats. The question is stated by the Court as
follows:
"Did the proprietor, in providing a perpendicular screen 26 feet high in front of the seats
immediately behind home plate, fulfill his duty to
provide some screened seats, or was it necessary
to also provide overhead protection for such
seats?"
The Court points out that there were no precedents
precisely on the factual situation and so resorts to general principles, stating them as follows:
"Lacking a precedent on the factual situation, we turn to general principles. Basic in the
law of negligence is the tenet that the duty to
use care is predicated upon knowledge of danger,
and the care which must be used in any particular situation is in proportion to the actor's
knowledge, actual or imputed, of the danger to
another in the act to be performed. Burr v.
Clark, 30 Wash. 2d 149, 190 P. 2d 769; 38 Am.
Jur. 678, Negligence, P. 32; 65 C.J.S., Negligence,
P. 5, p. 351.
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"This principle is an integral part of the law
relating to the liability of owners or occupants
of premises. Generally speaking, the possessor
of land is liable for injuries to a business visitor
caused by a condition· encountered on the premises only if he (a) knows or should have known
of such condition and that it involved an unreasonable risk; (b) has no reason to believe that
the visitor will discover the condition or realize
the risk ; and (c) fails to make the condition
reasonably safe or to warn th~ visitor so that
the latter may avoid the harm.-Rudson v. Kansas
City Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W. 2d
318, 142 A.L.R. 858; 2 Restatement of Torts 938,
P. .343 ; 38 Am. J ur ~ 754, Negligence, P. 96 ; 65
C.J. S·., Negligence, P. 45, p. 521.
"Respondent baseball club, of course, knew
that the seats immediately behind home plate
were not provided with overhead protection. But
did respondent have reason to believe that this
lack of overhe,ad protection involved an "unreasonable risk" of injury to the patrons~
"This would seem to be a jury question, had
there been a jury. There was no jury, and the
cause was dismissed at the close of appellant's
case, so that no findings of fact are before us.
It is therefore a question which we must determine de novo, on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, summarized above.
·
"In our opinion, under the facts· of this
case, respondent did not have reason to believe
that the lack of overhead protection involved
an unreasonable risk of injury to appellant. It
was not uncommon for foul balls to drop over the
vertical screen into this section of the stand.
However, there is nothing in the record, aside
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from this one incident, or in co1nmon experience,
to indicate that foul balls of this kind cause
serious injuries "'"ith sufficient frequency to be
considered an unreasonable risk.
·~so-called

foul tips, going into adjacent
stands ''~thout gaining any considerable eleva..
tion, are kno\vn to be dangerous, because their
speed makes avoidance difficult and serious injury more likely. Foul balls which go high
enough to clear a twenty-six-foot screen, ho\vever (and the ball in question apparently went
much higher), take longer to reach the seats,
and are therefore easier to dodge or catch. If
unsuccessful in this, the spectator is usually not
seriously injured, because the driving force of
the ball is gone and there is left only the force
of gravitation. The fact that in this case a serious
injury did result is not controlling. The question
is whether the proprietor had reason to believe,
before the accident happened, that lack of overhead protection would unreasonably endanger
appellant.
"While the baseball cases cited above do
not involve factual situations similar to the case
before us, several of them, in discussing the necessity of screening some seats, employ reasoning
which lends support to the views expressed above.
Thus, in Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, it is stated that "the perils are not
so imminent" (122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W. 708) that
due care on the part of the management requires
all the spectators to be screened in. In Grimes
v. American League Baseball Club, Mo. App.,
78 S.W. 2d 520, 523, the court said that "the
perils of the game are not so great" as to require
the screening of all seats. In Curtis v. Portland
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Baseball Club, where the plaintiff contended that
a foul ball had curved around the end of a
screen, the court held that the accident was one
which "could not reasonably have been anticipated." (130 Ore. 93, 279 P. 278.) In Cincinnati
Baseball Club v. Eno, it was said that the pro-prietor had the duty not to lead its invited guests
"into unusual dangers."-(112 Ohio St. 175, 14"7
N.E. 88.) In Hull v. Oklahoma City Baseball
Co., 196 Okl. 40, 163 P. 2d 982, 984, the court
absolved the defendant on the ground that "there
was no unreasonable risk" not appreciated by
the plaintiff as spectator. ·
"Applying any of these quoted tests as to
the duty to provide protective screening, we
conclude that respondent was not, with respect
to appellant, under a duty to provide overhead
protection on the occasion in question.
"Appellant further argues however, that having undertaken to provide some screening for
the -seats in question, the proprietor impliedly
assured the spectators who paid for admission
to the screened grandstand that seats behind
the screen were reasonably protected from the
known hazards of the game. In support of this
proposition, appellant cites Wells v. Minneapolis
Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, supra, and Edling v.
Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 181 Mo.
App. 327, 168 S.W. 908.
"In the Wells case, the screen extended to
the grandstand roof. The plaintiff claimed to
have been seated ten feet within the ar~a behind
the screen, but that a foul ball curved around
the end of the screen and struck her. Holding
for the defendant as a matter of law, the court
stated, among other things, that where the pro-
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prietor undertakes to screen, the screen must be
·reasonably sufficient as to extent and substance.'
No question was presented as to whether this
required overhead protection, the court simply
ruling that lateral screening was adequate under
the facts of the case. In the Edling case, the
plaintiff, 'Yhile sitting in a screened section immediately behind home plate, was struck by a foul
ball which passed through a large hole in the
'vire netting. It was in this connection that the
court, in sustaining a verdict for the plaintiff,
stated that the proprietor "impliedly assured
spectators" (181 Mo. App. 327, 168 S.W. 909)
who paid for admission to the grandstand that
seats behind the screen were reasonably protected.
"We are in f11ll agreement with the rule as
announced in these cases. It must be apparent,
however, that this implied assurance of protection has reference only to those hazards against
which the screen is obviously designed to protect. Just as the screening of seats in the Wells
case was held not to constitute an implied assurance that foul halls would not curve around the
end of the screening, so here, the twenty-six-foot
vertical screen gives rise to no assurance that
foul balls may not go over the top of the screen
and drop into the stands. It is true that the
curving of a foul ball around the end of the
screen is a highly improbable occurrence, while
the dropping of fouls behind vertical screens
is relatively frequent. The point is, however,
that in each case the obvious limits of the protection afforded is open and apparent to all
patrons, and in no sense constitutes a trap for
the unwary.
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"We have in mind, of course, that appellant
here did not actually know that there was no
overhead screening, and assumed that such protection was provided. Appellant's failure to
observe what was plainly there to be observed
cannot, however, operate to enlarge respondent's
duty of care beyond that which it would otherwise
be. The proprietor was entitled to assume that
patrons walking into the grandstand would note
that there was no roof, and hence nothing to which
ove-rhead screening could attach.
"A somewhat similar contention was advanced in Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club,
349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W. 2d 318, 142 A.L.R. 858,
the plaintiff there claiming that he was under
the impression that there was screening between
him and home plate. In affirming a judgment for
the defendant, the court said: "* * * A business
invitee may not recover for a condition as well
known to him as it is to his invitor and neither
may he impose liability on the owner or proprietor by failing and neglecting to see and observe
that which is perfectly open and obvious to a
person in possession of his faculties. (Citing
cases.)" 349 Mo. at page 1226, 164 S.W. 2d at
page 324.
"In our opinion, respondent is not liable to
appellant on any theory that the presence of
the vertical screen constituted an implied assurance to appellant that overhead protection was
provided, or was unnecessary."

Jones vs. Alexandria Baseball .Ass'n., ______ La. App.
~-----, 50 So. 2d 93, plaintiff alleges he paid the admission fee to the ball game and seated himself in the
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second row. of one of the bleacher sections behind a
wire screen 10 feet high. To the rear and left of plaintiff 'vas a pole from 'vhich the lights for night games
were controlled. A foul ball cleared the screen but
struck this pole, eausing the bail to ricochet therefrom
and striking plaintiff. Plaintiff watched it clear the
screen and go over his head, but watched it no farther.
Plaintiff contended he 'vas entitled as a patron to assume
that he was protected from hazards of the game at which
he was an innocent spectator; that the pole was negligently placed and constituted a hazard known to defendant only and a danger to spectators. The Court
held the petition failed to state a cause of action and
said:
"Plaintiff's petition discloses the fact that
defendant had taken reasonable precautions to
protect its patrons against ·any ordinary or expected hazards. To conclude that the defendant
was required to protect its patrons against every
possible danger or hazard would be, in effect,
to declare it the insurer of all spectators at its
games. It is only reasonable to consider that
almost all sports events and exhibitions comprehend certain risks and elements of danger to
spectators. Those who patronize such events must
assume the risk of injury unless carelessness or
negligence with respect to the neglect of reasonable precautions is established."

Curtis vs. Portland Baseball Club, 130 Ore. 93, 279
P. 277. Plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained when he was struck by a foul bail
while attending a baseball game.
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"He testified, however, that the screen was
directly in front of him and was about flush with
his seat. His seat was about 60 feet from the
batter's box and approximately 10 feet south of
a line between third base and horne plate. It
was on the second row, about 6 feet behind the
screen, and on the extreme northern end. The
screen covering the front of the grandstand was
40 feet high and 150 feet long. Plaintiff says
a foul-tipped ball, which had been pitched with
great speed, curved around the end of the screen
and struck him on the nose, :inflicting serious and
permanent injuries.
"Wherein was defendant derelict in its dutyf
What did it fail to do which ought to have been
done for the reasonable protection and safety
of plaintiff who paid for a seat in the grandstand
behind the screen~ Under the law, defendant
was obliged to exercise reasonabie care and diligence commensurate with the danger involved, to
protect its patrons from injury. Plaintiff, in the
absence of notice to the contrary, had the right to
assume that defendant would exercise care in
maintaining the premises in a reasonable safe
condition. Being in the business of providing
public entertainment for profit, the defendant was
required to use due care to protect its patrons
from injury. It was not, however, an insurer of
· their safety. It was required to use only that
degree of care exercised by persons of ordinary
prudence and caution engaged in similar business. It was not bound to guard against highly
improbable dangers or perils.
"Plaintiff says that a wing of the screen
should have been extended back into the grandstand for a distance of 8 or 10 feet in order to
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protect persons from foul balls. No court, so
far as 've are a'vare, has ever held that it was
the duty of a baseball park management to
screen the entire grandstand nor to construct
such ""'ings. Indeed, many peopie prefer to sit
'vhere their vision is not obstructed by wire netting. The defendant, in constructing 150 feet of
screen and maintaining it in good condition, did
its fu.ll duty in protecting patrons who might
reasonably be expected to be hit by a foul ball.
To hold that defendant should be obliged to erect
a zringed screen as claimed by plaintiff would
be subjecting it to a standard of care not warranted by law. We fail to see wherein the defendant has been remiss in its duty."
POINT III.
WHATEVER DANGER TO PLAINTIFF EXISTED FROM
FOUL BALLS GOING UP OVER THE SCREEN WAS AS
OBVIOUS TO HER AS TO DEFENDANT, AND SHE
ASSUMED THE RISK INCIDENT THERETO.

As already pointed out, Plaintiff's desire to sit in
a seat affording absolute protection against batted or
thrown balls, was not communicated to the Defendant.
It was hidden in her own mind. The Defendant had
a grandstand with a protective verlica;l screen 32 feet
high and 150 feet long. A seat in this screened area
was available to Plaintiff and she chose it, after passing
judgment upon the protection which the screen there
before her afforded. No one told her balls would not
go up over the screen and fall in the area where she
was seated. She was not misled by anything the De-
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fendant did or failed to do, with knowledge of the
security which Plaintiff sought as a spectator. The
screen was there visible for her to see, and it was perfectly obvious that there was no overhead covering.
There was no entrapment or latent or hidden defects
involved.
The general principie governing the owner's liability
to an invitee is stated in 38 Am. Jur. S-ec. 97, p. 757, as
follows:

"The liability of an owner or occupant to an
invitee for negligence in failing to render the
premises reasonably safe for the invitee, or in.
failing to warn him of dangers thereon, must be
predicated upon a superior knowledge concerning
the dangers of the premises to persons going
thereon. It is when the perilous instrumentality
is known to the owner or occupant and not known
to the person injured that a recovery is permitted.
The orwner is liable to invited persons for injuries
'occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land
or its approaches, if such condition was known
to him and not to them, and was negligently suffered to exist, without timely notice to the public
or to those who were likely to act upon such
invitation.'
"There is no liability for injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or
as well known to the person injured as they are
to the owner or occupant."

Hull vs. Oklahoma City Baseball Company, 163 P.
2d 982. The Court says:
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"Generally speaking, the possessor of land
is liable to a visitor only if he knows of or should
have known of a dangerous condition and realizes
that it involves unreasonable risk and has no
reason to believe that the plaintiff will disco¥er
the condition and fails to warn the visitor so
that the latter may avoid the harm. Restatement
Torts, Sec. 343.
"As we view the case, there was no unreasonable risk not appreciated by the plaintiff as a
spectator of the baseball game. As a consequence,
the trial court was justified in determining upon
failure to prove primary negligence."

Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 164 'S.W.
2nd 318. Plaintiff's complaint describes the typical baseball diamond and grandstand with-the grandstand seats
immediately back of home plate protected by a wire
netting or screen; that plaintiff asked for the best
reserved seat, payed the admission fee, and was under
the impression that he had secured a seat back of the
wire netting. However, his seat was outside the netting.
He alleges that the defendant was negligent in failing
to protect with wire netting the grandstand lying between his seat and the batter's box, in offering for sale
grandstand seats without notifying him whether they
were protected by a wire netting, and offering for sale
reserved seats which were not protected by the wire
netting, giving plaintiff reason to believe that his seat
would be protected by a wire netting, and giving him
notice to the contrary. The court quotes as follo,vs from
2 Restatement Law of Torts, Section 343, as follows:
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" 'A possessor land is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to business visitors by a
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only
if, he (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable
care could discover, the condition which, if known
to him, he sho1tld realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them, and (b) has no reason to
believe that they will discover the condition or
realize the risk involved therein, and (c) invites
or permits them to enter or remain upon the land
without exercising reasonable care (1) to make
the condition reasonably safe, or ( 2) to give a
warning adequate to enable them to avoid the
harm.'"
The Court continues:
"In baseball the patrons participate in the
sport as a spectator only, but in so doing subjects
himself to the dangers necessarily and usually
incident to and inherent in the game. This. does
not mean that he 'assumes the risk' of being
injured by the proprietor's negligence but that
by voluntarily entering into the sport as a spectator he knowingly accepts the reasonable risks
and hazards inherent in and incident to the game.
Bohlen, Studies in The Law of Torts, pp. 441444.
"The rules governing the land proprietor's
duty to his invitee presuppose that the possessor
knows of the condition and 'has no reason to
believe that they (his invitees) will discover the
condition or realize the risk involved therein.'
2 Restatement, Law of Torts, Sec. 343. The basis
of the proprietor's liability is his superior knowledge and if his invitee knows of the condition or
hazard there is no duty on the part of the pro-
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prietor to warn him and there is no liability
for result1~ng injury because the invitee has as
much knowledge as the proprietor does and then
by voluntarily acting, in view of his knowledge,
assnnzes the risks and dangers incident to the
known condition. State ex rei. First National
Bank v. Hughes, 346 ~fo. 938, 144 S.W. (2d) 84;
:Jiurray v. Ralph D'Oench Co., 347 Mo. 365, 147
S.W. (2d) 623; Paubel v. Ritz, 339 Mo. 274, 96
s.w. (2d) 369.
"Neither do we think the plaintiff's alleged
specia:l circumstances or his specific allegations
of negligence aid him in this respect. A business
invitee may not recover for a condition as well
known to him as it is to his invitor and neither
may he impose liability on the owner or proprietor by failing and neglecting to see and observe
that which is perfectly open and obvious to a
person in possession of his faculties. Ilgenfritz
v. Missouri P. & L. Co., 340 Mo. 648, 101 S.W.
(2d) 723; Stoll v. First National Bank, 345 Mo.
582, 134 S.W. (2d) 97; Mullen v. Sensenbrenner
Mercantile Co., Mo. Supp. 260 S.W. 982, 33 A.L.R.
176.

Anderson vs. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.
2d 170, the Court quotes the restatement of 1aw of
torts, quoted in the Hudson case, supra, and says:
"There are no special circumstances alleged
in the petition in the instant case which imposed
upon defendant a duty to warn plaintiff against
the dangers necessarily incident to the game she
was attending and which did not result from
negligence on the part of the defendant. The
danger of balls being fouled into the stands is
open and obvious to anyone who possesses normal
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powers of observation. A knowledge of the rules
or strategy of the game is not necessary to a
realization of such hazard. Plaintiff does not
allege that she communicated to Defendant her
unawareness of the dangers involved in sitting
in an unscreened portion of the stand."

Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, ______ Cal. ______ , 222
P. 2d 19.
The Court states :
"The applicable general principle is that the
owner of property, insofar as an invitee is concerned, is not an insurer of safety but must use
reasonable care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition and give warning of latent
or concealed perils. He is not liable for injury
to an invitee resulting from a danger which was
obvious or should have been observed in the
exercise of reasonable care. Shanley v. American
Olive Co., 185 Cal. 552, 555, 197 P. 793; Mautino
v. Sutter Hospital Ass'n, 211 Cal. 556, 560, 296
P. 76; Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas Co., 4 Cal. 2d 511,
512, 50 P. 2d 801; Dingman v. A. F·. Mattock
Co., 15 Cal. 2d 622, 624, 104 P. 2d 26. To the
extent that the duty of self-protection rests upon
the invitee, the duty of the invitor to protect is
reduced. The extent of these relative duties depends upon many factors involving the capacity
and opportunity of the invitor to protect the invitee and the capacity and opportunity of the
invitee to protect himself.
"In baseball, one of these factors is that the
patron participates in the sport as a spectator
and in so doing subjects himself to certain risks
necessarily and usually incident to and inherent
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in the game; risks that are obvious and should
be observed in the exercise of reasonable care.
This does not mean that he assumes the risk of
being injured by the proprietor's negligence but
that by voluntarily entering into the sport as a
spectator he knowingly accepts the . reasonable
risks and hazards inherent in and incident to the
game."

Shaw v. Boston American League Baseball Co.,
______ Mass. ______ , 90 N .E. 2nd 840: The C.ourt states the
legal principles here pertinent as follows:
" 'One maintaining a place of amusement who
has invited the public to attend upon the payment
of an admission fee is bound to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably
safe condition for their use, and to warn them
against any dangers which he knows or ought
to know they might encounter while upon the
premises and which they reasonably could not
be expected to know. * * * But no warning is
required to be given to one who already has
become apprized of the danger. or where the
situation is so obvious that a person of ordina.ry
intellligence would readily sense the likelihood
of impending harm and would take active measures to avert it." 307 Mass. page 104, 29 N.E.
2d page 718. To the same effect are Shanney v.
Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass.
168, 5 N.E. 2d 1, and cases therein cited.
"Cases involving baseball have arisen in
other jurisdictions and it has uniformly been
held-and correctly we think-that a spectator
familiar with the game assumes the reasonable
risks and hazards inherent in the game. Hudson
v. Kansas City Baseball Club, Inc., 349 Mo. 1215,
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1224, 164 S.W. 2d 318, 142 A.L.R. 858; Crane v.
Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168 Mo.
App. 301, 153 S.W. 1076; Kavafian v. Seattle
Baseball Club Association; 105 Wash. 215, 219221, 177 P. 776, 181 P. 679; Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Association, 185 Minn.
507, 240 N.W. 903. See note in 142 A.L.R. 868
et seq. And it is common knowledge that one of
these hazards is the possibility of being hit by
a foul ball." '
POINT IV.
THAT THERE ARE DANGERS INHERENT IN BASEBALL GAMES IS A MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE
AND P LA I N T I F F WAS, UNDER THE EVIDENCE,
CHARGED WITH SUCH KNOWLEDGE AND BOUND TO
TAKE NOTICE THEREOF.

The proposition here stated is closely connected
with the proposition discussed under Point III and some
of the cases there sustain our Point IV. But as bearing
specifically upon· this matter, we cite the following additional authorities:

Blakeley vs. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118
N.W. 482; The Court says:
"It is knowledge common to all that in· these
games hard halls are thrown and batted with
great swiftness; that they are liable to be muffed,
or batted, or thrown outside the lines of the
diamond, and visitors standing in positions that
may be reached by such balls have voluntarily
placed themselves and with knowledge of the
situation and may be held to assume the risk."
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Quinn vs. Recreation Park Association, 46 P. 2d
1-!-!, 3 Cal. 2nd 725. On the question of assumption of
risk the Court says :
"With respect to the law governing cases of
this kind it has been generally heid that one of
the natural risks assumed by spectators attending professional games is that of being struck
by batted or thrown balls; that the management
is not required, nor does it undertake to insure
patrons against injury from such source. All
that is required is the exercise of ordinary care
to protect patrons."

Brisson vs. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Association, 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903. Plaintiff was
injured when struck with a foul ball while he was seated
outside the screened part. He claims he was ignorant
of the risks to which he was exposed by the game with
which he said he was unfamiliar. As a smaU boy he
had witnesses ball games and as an adult he had witnessed at least one league game. The Court says:
"As said in the Ohio Case, above cited: 'The
concensus of the above opinions is to the effect
that it is common knowledge that in baseball
games hard balls are thrown and batted with
great swiftness, that they are liable to be thrown
or batted outside the lines of the diamond, and
that spectators in positions which may be reached
by such balls assume the risk thereof. This theory
is fortified by the fact that such spectators can
watch the ball and can thus usually avoid being
struck when a ball is directed toward them.' Does
the plaintiff's asserted ignorance of the risk to
which he was exposed take him outside of the
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usual rule in regard to spectators in his situation
at such games~ We are assuming it to be true
that his knowledge of the game was such only
as he had acquired by observation when he was
young and by seeing the more recent league game,
as well as the one he was then attending. In our
opinion no adult of reasonable intelligence, even
with the limited experience of the plaintiff, could
fail to realize that he would be injured if he was
struck by a thrown or batted ball, such as are
used in league games of the character which he
was observing, nor could he fail to realize that
foul balls were likely to be directed toward where
he was sitting. No one of ordinary intelligence
could see many innings of the ordinary league
game without coming to a full realization that
batters cannot, and do not, control the direction
of the ball which they strike and that foul tips
or liners may go in an entirely unexpected direction. He could not hear the bat strike the ball
many times without realizing that the ball wa$
a hard object. Even the sound of the contact o{
the ball with the gloves or m·itts of the players
would soon apprize him of that. It is our opinion
that the plaintiff, notwithstanding his alleged
limited experience, must be held to have assumed
the risk of the hazards to which he was exposed.
"The order appealed from is reversed, and
the case is remanded, with directions to the trial
court to enter judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict."

CONCLUSION
It is perfectly clear, from the authorities we have
cited, that the Defendant was not an insurer of the
Plaintiff's safety while she was seated in the grand-
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stand. It seems to be Plaintiff's position now, as revealed in her brief, that the Defendant was required
only to furnish a screen affording reasonable protection to Plaintiff from foul balls, but the mere fact that
a foul ball reached her position back of the screen
raises such an inference that the screen did not afford
reasonable protection as to require submission to the
jury, the question as to whether the screen afforded
reasonable protection. The fa!llacy of such a position
is apparent. Under it, either one of two alternatives
must result: either the protection must be absolute so
that no ball could, under any condition, reach the spec-tator, in which event there would never be a law-suit,
or there could be no instance where the ball happened
to reach the spectator when the C-ourt could decide as
a matter of law that the screen afforded such reasonable protection as to discharge the owner's duty to the
spectator.
Furthermore, Plaintiff's position with respect to
assumption of risk follows the same concept. While she
now states that the duty of the owner is to furnish
a screen affording reasonable p.rotection, she, nevertheless, when a screen is furnished, may assume she
will he absolutely protected from foul balls, and if a
foul ball reaches her, it is always a question for the
jury to decide whether she was cognizant of and assumed the risk of being struck by a foul ball.
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We submit that on both propositions Plaintiff's
position is untenable. There is no dispute as to the
character of the screen; there is no claim that it was
defective in any particular; it was perfectly visible to
Plaintiff, and its nature,· height, and location were
definitely shown and agreed upon before the Trial Court.
So there is no additional evidence that could be given
on these features, and there is no conflict of evidence
as to any of them. It then became a question for the
Court to determine, as a matter of law, whether the
Defendant's duty to provide a screen affording reasonable, not absolute, protection had been provided, and,
further, whether Plaintiff assumed the risk. Under the
facts before the Court, it could not do otherwise than
hold against Plaintiff on both propositions. As to the
assumption of risk, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the Trial Court was required to assume that
Plaintiff was of age and was a woman of ordinary intelligence; that she had ordinary vision and saw what was
perfectly obvious and apparent to be seen; that she
had knoWledge that baseballs are hard and might be
batted in any direction with speed or at considerable
height; that she knew a person struck by a ball might
sustain injury; and that she knew a game of baseball
involved some hazard to spectators from batted or
thrown balls, which the Courts all say is common knowledge.
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Under such conditions it became a question of law
as to whether Plaintiff was entitled to recover. Under
Plaintiff's theory Defendant was an insurer of her
safety. We have demonstrated that such is not the
law. When all the facts are undisputed, it is for the
Trial Court to say, as a matter of law, whether under
such facts the case should be submitted to the jury.
And we earnestly submit that under the facts of this
case Plaintiff was not entitled to recover; first, because
the Defendant discharged its duty to her as a spectator,
and second, because she assumed whatever risk was
involved in sitting where she did. The judgment should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney,
HOMER HOLMGREN,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Assistant City Attorneys,

--

·'

Attorneys for Respondent.
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